Abstract-Generalizing standard monadic second-order logic for Kripke models, we introduce monadic second-order logic MSO(T) interpreted over coalgebras for an arbitrary set functor T. Similar to well-known results for monadic second-order logic over trees, we provide a translation of this logic into a class of automata, relative to the class of T-coalgebras that admit a tree-like supporting Kripke frame. We then consider invariance under behavioral equivalence of MSO(T)-formulas; more in particular, we investigate whether the coalgebraic mu-calculus is the bisimulation-invariant fragment of MSO(T). Building on recent results by the third author we show that in order to provide such a coalgebraic generalization of the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem, it suffices to find what we call an adequate uniform construction for the functor T. As applications of this result we obtain a partly new proof of the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem, and bisimulation invariance results for the bag functor (graded modal logic) and all exponential polynomial functors.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Logic, automata and coalgebra
The aim of this paper is to strengthen the link between the areas of logic, automata and coalgebra. More in particular, we provide a coalgebraic generalization of the automata-theoretic approach towards monadic second-order logic (MSO), and we address the question whether the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem can be generalized from Kripke structures to the setting of arbitrary coalgebras.
The connection between monadic second-order logic and automata is classic, going back to the seminal work of Büchi, Rabin, and others. For instance, Rabin's decidability result for the monadic second-order theory of binary trees, or S2S, makes use of a translation of monadic second-order logic into a class of automata, thus reducing the satisfiability problem for S2S to the non-emptiness problem for the corresponding automata [1] . The link between MSO and automata over trees with arbitrary branching was further explored by Walukiewicz [2] . Janin and Walukiewicz considered monadic second-order logic interpreted over Kripke structures, and used automata-theoretic techniques to obtain a van Benthemlike characterization theorem for monadic second-order logic, identifying the modal μ-calculus as the bisimulation invariant fragment of MSO [3] . Given the fact that in many applications bisimilar models are considered to represent the same process, one has little interest in properties of models that are not bisimulation invariant. Thus the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem can be seen as an expressive completeness result, stating that all relevant properties in monadic second-order logic can be expressed in the modal μ-calculus.
Coalgebra enters naturally into this picture. Recall that Universal Coalgebra [4] provides the notion of a coalgebra as the natural mathematical generalization of state-based evolving systems such as streams, (infinite) trees, Kripke models, (probabilistic) transition systems, and many others. This approach combines simplicity with generality and wide applicability: many features, including input, output, nondeterminism, probability, and interaction, can easily be encoded in the coalgebra type T (formally an endofunctor on the category Set of sets as objects with functions as arrows). Starting with Moss' seminal paper [5] , coalgebraic logics have been developed for the purpose of specifying and reasoning about behavior, one of the most fundamental concepts that allows for a natural coalgebraic formalization. And with Kripke structures constituting key examples of coalgebras, it should come as no surprise that most coalgebraic logics are some kind of modification or generalization of modal logic [6] .
The coalgebraic modal logics that we consider here originate with Pattinson [7] ; they are characterized by a completely standard syntax, in which the semantics of each modality is determined by a so-called predicate lifting (see Definition 2 below). Many well-known variations of modal logic in fact arise as the coalgebraic logic ML Λ associated with a set Λ of such predicate liftings; examples include both standard and (monotone) neighborhood modal logic, graded and probabilistic modal logic, coalition logic, and conditional logic. Extensions of coalgebraic modal logics with fixpoint operators, needed for describing ongoing behavior, were developed in [8] , [9] .
The link between coalgebra and automata theory is by now well-established. For instance, finite state automata operating on finite words have been recognized as key examples of coalgebra from the outset [4] . More relevant for the purpose of this paper is the link with precisely the kind of automata mentioned earlier, since the (potentially infinite) objects on which these devices operate, such as streams, trees and Kripke frames, usually are coalgebras. Thus, the automata-theoretic perspective on modal fixpoint logic could be lifted to the abstraction level of coalgebra [8] , [10] . In fact, many key results in the theory of automata operating on infinite objects, such as Muller & Schupp's Simulation Theorem [11] can in fact be seen as instances of more general theorems in Universal Coalgebra [12] .
B. Coalgebraic monadic second-order logic
Missing from this picture is, to start with, a coalgebraic version of (monadic) second-order logic. Filling this gap is the first aim of the current paper, which introduces a notion of monadic second-order logic MSO T for coalgebras of type T. Our formalism combines two ideas from the literature. First of all, we looked for inspiration to the coalgebraic versions of first-order logic of Litak & alii [13] . These authors introduced Coalgebraic Predicate Logic as a common generalisation of first-order logic and coalgebraic modal logic, combining firstorder quantification with coalgebraic syntax based on predicate liftings. Our formalism MSO T will combine a similar syntactic feature with second-order quantification. Second, following the tradition in automata-theoretic approaches towards monadic second-order logic, our formalism will be one-sorted. That is, we only allow second-order quantification in our language, relying on the fact that individual quantification, when called for, can be encoded as second-order quantification relativized to singleton sets. Since predicate liftings are defined as families of maps on powerset algebras, these two ideas fit together very well, to the effect that our second-order logic is in some sense simpler than the first-order formalism of [13] .
In section III we will define, for any set Λ of monotone 1 predicate liftings, a formalism MSO Λ , and we let MSO T denote the logic obtained by taking for Λ the set of all monotone predicate liftings. Clearly we will make sure that this definition generalizes the standard case, in the sense that the standard version of MSO for Kripke structures instantiates the logic MSO {♦} and is equivalent to the coalgebraic logic MSO P (where P denotes the power set functor). The introduction of a monadic second-order logic MSO T for T-coalgebras naturally raises the question, for which T does the coalgebraic modal μ-calculus for T correspond to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of MSO T .
Question 1. Which functors T satisfy μML T ≡ MSO T / ?
1 In the most general case, restricting to monotone predicate liftings is not needed, one could define MSO T as the logic obtained by taking for Λ the set of all predicate liftings. However, in the context of this paper, where we take an automata-theoretic perspective on MSO, this restriction makes sense.
C. Automata for coalgebraic monadic second-order logic
In order to address Question 1, we take an automatatheoretic perspective on the logics MSO T and μML T , and as the second contribution of this paper we introduce a class of parity automata for MSO T .
As usual, the operational semantics of our automata is given in terms of a two-player acceptance game, which proceeds in rounds moving from one basic position to another, where a basic position is a pair consisting of a state of the automaton and a point in the coalgebra structure under consideration. In each round, the two players, ∃ and ∀, focus on a certain local 'window' on the coalgebra structure. This 'window' takes the shape of a one-step T-model, that is, a triple (X, α, V ) consisting of a set X, a chosen object α ∈ TX, and a valuation V interpreting the states of the automaton as subsets of X. More specifically, during each round of the game it is the task of ∃ to come up with a valuation V that creates a one-step model in which a certain one-step formula δ (determined by the current basic position in the game) is true.
Generally, our automata will have the shape A = (A, Δ, Ω, a I ) where A is a finite carrier set with initial state a I ∈ A, and Ω and Δ are the parity and transition map of A, respectively. The flavour of such an automaton is largely determined by the co-domain of its transition map Δ, the so-called one-step language which consists of the one-step formulas that feature in the acceptance game as described.
Each one-step language L induces its own class of automata Aut(L). For instance, the class of automata corresponding to the coalgebraic fixpoint logic μML Λ can be given as Aut(ML Λ ), where ML Λ is the set of positive modal formulas of depth one that use modalities from Λ [10] . Basically then, the problem of finding the right class of automata for the coalgebraic monadic second-order logic MSO Λ consists in the identification of an appropriate one-step language. Our proposal comprises a one-step second-order logic which uses predicate liftings to describe the chosen object of the one-step model.
Finally, note that similar to the case of standard MSO, the equivalence between formulas in MSO T and automata in Aut(SO) is only guaranteed to hold for coalgebras that are 'tree-like' in some sense (to be defined further on).
Theorem 1 (Automata for coalgebraic MSO). For any set Λ of monotone predicate liftings for T there is an effective construction mapping any formula ϕ ∈ MSO Λ into an automaton A ϕ ∈ Aut(SO Λ ), which is equivalent to ϕ over T-tree models.
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds by induction on the complexity of MSO T -formulas, and thus involves various closure properties of automata, such as closure under complementation, union and projection. In order to establish these results, it will be convenient to take an abstract perspective, revealing how closure properties of a class of automata are completely determined at the level of the one-step language.
D. Bisimulation Invariance
With automata-theoretic characterizations in place for both coalgebraic MSO and the coalgebraic μ-calculus μML, we can address Question 1 by considering the following question:
Continuing the program of the third author [14] , we will approach this question at the level of the one-step languages, SO and ML. To start with, observe that any translation (from one-step formulas in) SO to (one-step formulas in) ML naturally induces a translation from SO-automata to ML-automata. A new observation we make here is that any so-called uniform construction on the class of one-step models for the functor T that satisfies certain adequacy conditions, provides (1) a translation (·) * : SO → ML, together with (2) a construction (·) * transforming a pointed T-model (S, s) into a tree model (S * , s * ) which is a coalgebraic pre-image of (S, s) satisfying
From this it easily follows that an SO-automaton A is bisimulation invariant iff it is equivalent to the ML-automaton A * . On the basis of these observations we can prove the following generalisation of the Janin-Walukiewicz Theorem.
Theorem 2 (Coalgebraic Bisimulation Invariance). If the set functor T admits an adequate uniform construction, then
In our eyes, the significance of Theorem 2 is twofold. First of all, the proof separates the 'clean', abstract part of bisimulation-invariance results from the more functor-specific parts. As a consequence, Theorem 2 can be used to obtain immediate results in particular cases. Examples include the power set functor (standard Kripke structures), where the adequate uniform construction roughly consists of taking ω-fold products (see Example 1), the bag functor (Example 2), and all exponential polynomial functors (Corollary 3). Second, in case the functor does not admit an adequate uniform construction, Theorem 2 may still be of use in proving alternative characterization results for the functor.
Instantiating the latter phenomenon is the monotone neighborhood functor M (see the next section for its definition). The importance of this functor lies, among other things, in it providing a coalgebraic semantics for monotone modal logic [15] . The coalgebraic monadic second-order language MSO M is equivalent to a natural second-order language for reasoning about monotone neighborhood structures that we shall denote by MMSO, and μML M is equivalent to the fixpointextension of monotone modal logic, denoted μMML. As we shall see in Proposition 12 below, M does not admit an adequate uniform construction. 2 This, however, is not the end of the story. It turns out that we can find an adequate uniform construction for a variant M of the functor M (see Proposition 14) . As a corollary, we obtain a characterization of the fragment of MMSO that is invariant under global bisimulations (bisimulations that are full on both domain and codomain). This fragment turns out to be exactly the extension of the monotone μ-calculus with the global modalities (for precise definitions we refer to section VI), which we shall denote μMML g .
In this notation, our final contribution is the following characterization result: 
II. SOME TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
In this paper we assume familiarity with the basic theory of modal (fixpoint) logic, monadic second-order logic, coalgebra, coalgebraic modal (fixpoint) logic, and parity games. Here we fix some notation and terminology.
A. Kripke models and their logics
We restrict to the theory of modal logic with one modality (and hence, one accessibility relation). Let Var be a fixed infinite supply of variables. A Kripke model is a structure S = (S, R, V ) where S is a set, R ⊆ S × S and V : Var → P(S) is a Var -valuation. Associated with such a valuation V , we define the conjugate coloring
is as V except that it maps the variable p to T . A pointed Kripke model is a structure (S, u) where S is a Kripke model and u is a point in S. Turning to syntax, we define the formulas of monadic second-order logic MSO through the following grammar:
with p, q ∈ Var . Formulas are evaluated over pointed Kripke models by the following induction:
We present the language of the modal μ-calculus μML in negation normal form, by the following grammar:
where p ∈ Var , η ∈ {μ, ν}, and in the formula ηp.ϕ no free occurrence of the variable p may be in the scope of a negation.
The satisfaction relation between pointed Kripke models and formulas in μML is defined by the usual induction, with, e.g.
where ϕ p (Z) denotes the truth set of the formula ϕ in the model
. We assume familiarity with the notion of bisimilarity between two (pointed) Kripke models, and say that a formula of MSO is bisimulation invariant if it has the same truth value in any pair of bisimilar pointed Kripke models.
Fact 1. [3] A formula ϕ of MSO is equivalent to a formula of μML iff ϕ is invariant for bisimulations.
B. Coalgebras and models
Our basic semantic structures consist of coalgebras together with valuations. We only consider coalgebras over the base category Set with sets as objects and functions as arrows. The co-and contravariant power set functors will be denoted by P and Q : Set → Set op , respectively. Covariant endofunctor on Set will be called set functors. The usual notion of a p-morphism between Kripke models can be generalized as follows: Let S 1 = (S 1 , σ 1 , V 1 ) and S 2 = (S 2 , σ 2 , V 2 ) be two T-models and let f : S 1 → S 2 be any map. Then f is said to be a T-model homomorphism if:
1) for each variable p and each
; 2) the map f is a coalgebra morphism, i.e. we have
Two pointed coalgebras (S, s) and (S , s ) are behaviorally equivalent, notation: S, s S , s , if s and s can be identified by coalgebra morphisms f : S → T and f :
A coalgebraic logic consists of a set L of formulas together with, for each coalgebra (S, σ), a truth or satisfaction relation
ϕ whenever S, s S , s . Kripke frames are coalgebras for the (covariant) power set functor P. A functor of particular interest in this paper is the monotone neighborhood functor M, usually defined as the subfunctor of Q • Q given by setting MX ⊆ QQX to be:
This functor comes equipped with the following notion of bisimilarity. A neighborhood bisimulation between M-models S 1 and S 2 is a relation R ⊆ S 1 × S 2 such that, if s 1 Rs 2 then:
C. Coalgebraic μ-calculus & coalgebra automata
The modal μ-calculus is just one in a family of logical systems that may collectively be referred to as the coalgebraic μ-calculus [9] . These logics essentially make use of predicate liftings.
Definition 2. Given a set functor T, an n-place predicate lifting for T is a natural transformation
where Q(−) n denotes the n-fold product of Q with itself. A predicate lifting λ is said to be monotone if
Given a set functor T, the language μML T of the coalgebraic μ-calculus for T is defined thus:
where p ∈ Var , λ is any monotone n-place predicate lifting for T, η ∈ {μ, ν}, and, in ηp.ϕ, no free occurrence of the variable p is in the scope of a negation. If we restrict the formulas λ(ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ n ) so that λ must come frome some distinguished set of liftings Λ, then we denote the corresponding sublanguage of μML T by μML Λ .
The semantics of formulas in a pointed T-model is defined as follows:
. It is routine to prove that all formulas in μML T are bisimulation invariant.
Turning to the parity automata corresponding to the language μML Λ , we first define the modal one-step language ML 1 Λ . Its set ML 1 Λ (A) of modal one-step formulas over a set A of variables is given by the following grammar:
where ψ 1 , ..., ψ n are formulas built up from variables in A using disjunctions and conjunctions.
Definition 3. Given a functor T and a set of variables A, a one-step model over A is a triple (X, α, V ) where X is any set, α ∈ TX and V : A → P(X) is a valuation.
The semantics of formulas in the modal one-step language in a one-step model is given as follows:
• standard clauses for the boolean connectives,
where ψ i ⊆ X is the (classical) truth set of the formula ψ i under the valuation V . We can now define the class of automata used to characterize the coalgebraic μ-calculus. Definition 4. Let P be a finite set of variables and Λ a set of predicate liftings. Then a (P -chromatic) modal Λ-automaton is a tuple (A, Δ, Ω, a I ) where A is a finite set of states with
is the transition map of the automaton, and Ω : A → ω is the parity map. The class of these automata is denoted as Aut(ML Λ ).
The acceptance game for an automaton A = (A, Δ, Ω, a I ) and a T-model (S, σ, V ) is given by the following table:
The loser of a finite match is the player who got stuck, and the winner of an infinite match is ∃ if the greatest parity that appears infinitely often in the match is even, and the winner is ∀ if this parity is odd. The automaton A accepts the pointed model (S, s) if ∃ has a winning strategy in the acceptance game from the starting position (a I , s). We say that an automaton A is equivalent to a formula ϕ ∈ μML Λ if, for every pointed 
That is, there are effective transformations of formulas in μML Λ into equivalent automata in Aut(ML Λ ), and vice versa.
III. COALGEBRAIC MSO
We now introduce coalgebraic monadic second-order logic for a set functor T and a set of liftings Λ and show how MSO can be recovered as a special case. We define the syntax of the monadic second-order logic MSO T by the following grammar:
where λ is any n-place monotone predicate lifting and p, q, q 1 , ..., q n ∈ V ar. More generally, restricting to a set Λ of monotone liftings for T, we define the sublanguage MSO Λ ⊆ MSO T by the same grammar except that we require the liftings to be in Λ.
For the semantics, let (S, s) be a pointed T-model. We define the satisfaction relation ⊆ S × MSO T as follows:
for all v ∈ V (p), • standard clauses for the Boolean connectives
We introduce the following abbreviations:
expressing, respectively, that p and q are equal, that p denotes the empty set, and that p denotes a singleton.
Clearly, standard MSO is the logic MSO {♦} , where ♦ is the predicate lifting corresponding to the usual diamond modality over Kripke models. Obviously then, MSO P contains MSO. In order to see that the languages are in fact equivalent in expressive power, we need the notion of expressive completeness, which plays an important role in this paper.
Definition 5. A set of monotone liftings Λ for a set functor T is said to be expressively complete if, for every finite set of variables A and every monotone predicate lifting
If Λ is expressively complete, then clearly μML Λ is equivalent in expressive power to the full language μML T . It is not much harder to show that, under the same conditions, MSO Λ is equivalent in expressive power to the full language MSO T . Furthermore, expressive completeness can often be obtained fairly easily if we make use of an application of the Yoneda lemma to represent n-place predicate liftings as subsets of T(2 n ), a method developed in [16] . In particular, since the liftings { , ♦} for P are expressively complete and is clearly definable in MSO {♦} , one can show that MSO = MSO {♦} is equivalent in expressive power to the full coalgebraic logic MSO P . Furthermore, μML P is equivalent to μML { ,♦} . As a second example, involving the monotone neighborhood functor M, let here be the predicate lifting defined by α ∈ X (Z) iff Z ∈ α, and let ♦ be its dual. Then the language MSO M is equivalent to MSO { ,♦} , and also μML M is equivalent to μML { ,♦} .
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, the key question in this paper will be to compare the expressive power of coalgebraic monadic second-order logic to that of the coalgebraic μ-calculus. The following observation, of which the (routine) proof is omitted, provides the easy part of the link. Proposition 1. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate lfitings for the set functor T. There is an inductively defined translation (·) mapping any formula ϕ ∈ μML Λ to an equivalent formula ϕ ∈ MSO Λ .
IV. AUTOMATA FOR COALGEBRAIC MSO
In this section we introduce automata for coalgebraic monadic second-order logic.
A. A general perspective on parity automata
Standard monadic second-order formulas can be translated to equivalent automata over trees, but this equivalence is not guaranteed to extend to arbitrary Kripke models. In the case of general coalgebra, we should expect having to introduce a coalgebraic concept of "tree-like" models.
Definition 6. Given a set S and α ∈ TS, a subset X ⊆ S is said to be a support for α if there is some β ∈ TX with Tι X,S (β) = α. A supporting Kripke frame for a T-coalgebra (S, σ) is a binary relation R ⊆ S × S such that, for all u ∈ S, R(u) = {v | uRv} is a support for σ(u).
Definition 7.
A T-tree model is a structure (S, R, u) where S = (S, σ, V ) is a T-model and u ∈ S, such that R is a supporting Kripke frame for the coalgebra (S, σ), and furthermore (S, R) is a tree rooted at u, so that there is a unique R-path from u to w for each w ∈ S.
Our goal is to translate formulas in MSO T to equivalent automata over T-tree models. We start by introducing a very general type of automaton, originating with [14] .
Definition 8. Given a finite set A, a generalized predicate lifting over A comprises an assignment of a map
to every set X. Concepts like Boolean dual and monotonicity apply to these liftings in the obvious way.
The difference with respect to standard predicate liftings is that the components of a generalized predicate lifting do not need to form a natural transformation. 4 Definition 9. A one-step language L consists of a collection L(A) of generalized predicate liftings for every finite set A. The semantics of a generalized predicate lifting ϕ in a one-step model (X, α, V ) is given by
Our automata will be indexed by a (finite) set of variables involved, corresponding to the set of free variables of the MSO T -formula.
Definition 10. Let P ⊆ Var be a finite set of variables and let L be a one-step language for functor T. A (P -chromatic) L-automaton is a structure (A, Δ, Ω, a I ) where
• A is a finite set, with a I ∈ A, • Ω : A → ω is a parity map, and
The acceptance game of A with respect to a T-tree model (T, R, σ, V, u) is given by Table I . We say that the automaton A accepts the model (T, R, σ, V, u) if ∃ has a winning strategy in this game (initialized at position (a I , u) ).
B. Closure properties
This abstract level is useful for establishing some simple closure properties of automata, based on properties of the one-step language. The first, easy, results establish sufficient conditions for closure under union and complementation. The most interesting property concerns closure under existential projection. The following terminology is taken from [3] , but instead of relying on a particular syntactic shape of onestep formulas, we define the concepts in purely semantic terms.
Definition 11. A predicate lifting ϕ over A is said to be special basic if, for every one-step model (X, α, V ) such that
Call an L-automaton non-deterministic if every lifting Δ(a, c) is special basic.
It is easy to see that if the language L is closed under disjunctions, then so is its fragment of special basic liftings. From this we obtain the following. Proof: Suppose A = (A, Δ, a I , Ω) is a non-deterministic L-automaton for the variable set P . Define the P \q-chromatic automaton ∃q.A = (A, Δ * , a I , Ω) by setting
It is easy to see that every T-tree model accepted by A is also accepted by ∃p.A. Conversely, suppose ∃p.A accepts some T-tree model (S, R, σ, V, s I ). For each winning position (a, s) in the acceptance game, let V (a,s) be the valuation chosen by ∃ according to some given winning strategy χ. Note that we can assume that χ is a positional winning strategy, since ∃p.A is a parity automaton. It is not difficult to see that the automaton ∃p.A is a non-deterministic automaton, and so for each winning position (a, s) there is a valuation V * (a,s) : A → P(R(s)), which is an admissible move for ∃, such that V * (a,s) (b) ⊆ V (a,s) (b) and such that for all choices for ∀ are introduced. Furthermore, χ * is clearly still a positional winning strategy.
From these facts it follows by a simple induction on the depth of the nodes in the supporting tree that the strategy χ * is scattered, i.e. that for every s ∈ S there is at most one automaton state a such that (a, s) appears in a χ * -guided match of the acceptance game. So we can define a valuation V like V except we evaluate q to be true at all and only the states s such that
where a s is a necessarily unique automaton state such that (a, s) appears in some χ * -guided match, and c is the color consisting of the variables true under V at s. It is not hard to show that A accepts (S, R, σ, V , s I ).
C. Second-order automata
We now introduce a more concrete one-step language for a given set functor T and a given set of (natural) liftings Λ, and show that MSO Λ can be translated into the corresponding class of automata.
Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for T. The set of second-order one-step formulas over any set of variables A and relative to the set of liftings Λ is defined by the grammar:
where a, b, a 1 , ..., a n ∈ A and λ is any predicate lifting in Λ. Fixing an infinite set of "one-step variables" V ar 1 , and given a finite set A, the set of second-order one-step sentences over A, denoted SO 1 Λ (A), is the set of one-step formulas over A∪V ar 1 , with all free variables belonging to A. We write SO 1 T (A) when Λ comprises all monotone liftings for T.
The semantics of a one-step second-order A-formula in a one-step model (X, α, V ) (with V : A → P(X)) is defined by the following clauses:
• standard clauses for the Boolean connectives,
S ⊆ X. Any one-step second-order A-sentence ϕ can be regarded as a generalized predicate lifting over A, with
Note that the syntax of SO 1 T allows negations, implying that not all these predicate liftings are monotone.
Definition 12. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for T. A second-order Λ-automaton is an L-automaton for L being the assignment of the one-step second-order A-sentences SO 1 Λ (A) to every set of variables A. We write Aut(SO Λ ) to denote this class, and Aut(SO T ) in case Λ is the set of all monotone predicate liftings for T.
Our aim is to prove that every formula of MSO Λ can be translated into an equivalent second-order Λ-automaton (over rooted T-tree models), and the main problem here is to obtain closure under existential projection.
The key to this step is a simulation theorem. First, a useful trick due to Walukiewicz [2] allows us to transform any second-order automaton into one in which all the one-step formulas are monotone, when regarded as generalized predicate liftings. We call such an automaton a monotone automaton.
Proposition 5. Let Λ be any set of monotone predicate liftings. Every automaton A ∈ Aut(SO Λ ) is equivalent to a monotone second-order A ∈ Aut(SO Λ ).
Proof: Enumerate A as {a 1 , ..., a k }, and just replace each formula Δ(a, c) by in Δ(a, c) . This new formula is monotone in the variables A and the resulting automaton is equivalent to A.
The intuition behind the simulation theorem is the same as that behind the standard "powerset construction" for word automata: the states of the new non-deterministic automaton A n are "macro-states" representing several possible states of A at once. Formally, the states of A n will be binary relations over A, and given a macro-state R, its range gives an exact description of the states in A that are currently being visited simultaneously. In fact, it is safe to think of the macro-states as subsets of A: the only reason that we have binary relations over A as states rather than just subsets is to have a memory device so that we can keep track of traces in infinite matches. For each macro-state R and each colour c we want to be able to say that the one-step formulas corresponding to each state in the range of R hold, so we want to translate the one-step formulas over A into one-step formulas over the set of macro-states. In order to translate a formula Δ(a, c) to a new one-step formula with macro-states as variables, we have to replace the variable b in Δ(a, c) with a new variable that acts as a stand-in for b. For this purpose we introduce a new, existentally quantified variable Z b , together with a formula stating explicitly that Z b is to represent the union of the values of all those macro states that contain b. Furthermore we want all the one-step formulas to be special basic, and for this purpose we simply add a conjunct "disj" to each one-step formula, stating that the values of any pair of distinct variables appearing in the formula are to be disjoint. Finally, in order to turn A n into a parity automaton, we use a stream automaton to detect bad traces (see for instance [17] for the details in a more specific case). We omit the details of the proof.
Theorem 4 (Simulation). Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for T. For any monotone automaton A ∈ Aut(SO Λ ) there exists an equivalent non-deterministic A ∈ Aut(SO Λ ).
Combining Proposition 4 with Theorem 4, we easily obtain the following closure property.
Proposition 6. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for a set functor T. Over T-tree models, the class of secondorder Λ-automata is closed under existential projection.
We can now use the closure properties we have established for second-order automata to give the desired translation of MSO T into second-order automata.
Proposition 7.
For every formula ϕ ∈ MSO Λ with free variables in P , there exists a P -chromatic automaton A ϕ ∈ Aut(SO Λ ) which is equivalent to ϕ over T-tree models.
Proof: Proceeding by a straightforward induction on the complexity of ϕ, we leave it to the reader to construct appropriate automata for the atomic formulas. The inductive cases for disjunction and negation follow by the Propositions 2 and 3, together with the easy observation that the one-step language SO Λ is closed under disjunction and Boolean duals. The case of existential quantification is taken care of by Proposition 6. Theorem 1 is immediate from this, as is the following. Corollary 1. Suppose Λ is any set of monotone predicate liftings for T such that MSO T ≡ MSO Λ . Then for every formula of MSO T , there exists an equivalent second-order Λ-automaton over T-tree models. In particular, this holds whenever Λ is expressively complete.
V. BISIMULATION INVARIANCE
This section continues the program of [14] , making use of the automata-theoretic translation of MSO T we have just established. The gist of our approach is that, in order to characterize a coalgebraic fixpoint logic μML T as the bisimulation-invariant fragment of MSO T , it suffices to establish a certain type of translation between the corresponding one-step languages. First we need some definitions.
Definition 13. Given sets X, Y , a mapping h : X → Y and a valuation V : A → Q(Y ), we define the valuation V
The most important concept that we take from [14] is that of a uniform translation (called uniform correspondence in [14] ). For this we need a few auxiliary definitions: Definition 14. A one-step frame is a pair (X, α) with α ∈ TX. A homomorphism of one-step frames h : (X , α ) → (X, α) is a map h : X → X with Th(α ) = α. A one-step frame (X , α ) together with a homomorphism h : (X , α ) → (X, α) is called a cover of (X, α).
We can now define the notions of uniform translations and uniform constructions:
Definition 15. Given a functor T, a uniform construction F for T is an assignment of a cover h α : (X * , α * ) → (X, α) to every one-step frame (X, α).
Definition 16. We say that the second-order one-step language SO 1 Λ (A) admits uniform translations if, given any natural number k, there exists a uniform construction F and an assignment of a monotone (natural) predicate lifting
to each monotone one-step formula ϕ ∈ SO 1 Λ with free variables A and quantifier depth at most k, such that for any one-step model (X, α, V ), we have
Remark 1. It is easy to see that every monotone predicate lifting λ : Q(−)
A → Q • T is equivalent to an atomic formula of ML 1 T (A). In the following we shall not take care to distinguish between such a monotone predicate lifting and the corresponding atomic formula. Since the proof of the following result closely follows that of the main result in [14] , we omit the details. The main difference with [14] is that here we need an "unravelling"-like component.
Proposition 8. Assume that SO
Λ admits a uniform translation (·)
* , and let A be a second-order Λ-automaton.
Then for each pointed T-model (S, s) there is a T-tree model (T, R, t), with a T-model homomorphism f from T to S, mapping t to s, and such that
From this, a routine argument yields the following result. The existence of uniform translations for the one-step language [14] involves two components: a translation on the syntactic side and a uniform construction on the semantic side. However, as we shall now see, we can focus entirely on finding a suitable uniform construction for the one-step models; the syntactic translation will come for free. 
The following is obvious:
If ϕ is a monotone formula then ϕ * is a monotone generalized predicate lifting.
Note that, in order for SO 1 Λ (A) to admit a uniform translation, it suffices that there exists for any k a uniform construction F such that, for every formula ϕ of quantfier depth ≤ k, the generalized lifting ϕ * is natural. An equivalent formulation of this condition is the following. 
The following diagram clarifies condition ( ):
Definition 19. A uniform construction F is said to be adequate for k, and with respect to the liftings Λ, if the equivalence ( ) holds for all (monotone) formulas in SO 1 Λ (A) of quantifier depth ≤ k (for any finite set of variables A).
Since we could of course take the quantifier depth k and the set of liftings as extra inputs for the uniform construction, we shall simply say that the functor T admits an adequate uniform construction if there is an adequate uniform construction for T with respect to every k and every set of monotone liftings. If Λ is an expressively complete set of liftings, this is equivalent to requiring an adequate uniform construction with respect to Λ, for every k.
The following theorem, from which we obtain Theorem 2 by taking for Λ the set of all monotone liftings for T, summarizes the results of this section. 
Example 1. As a first application, the standard JaninWalukiewicz characterization of the modal μ-calculus can be seen as an instance of the result by taking Λ = { , ♦} and T = P, recalling that MSO = MSO {♦} ≡ MSO { ,♦} . The adequate uniform construction for P is given as follows: consider a pair (X, α) with α ∈ P(X). We take this to X * = α * = α × ω, and we let h α : α × ω → α be the projection map.
It turns out that several other applications of this result can be obtained in a particularly simple way. Say that a uniform construction F is strongly adequate if, for any mapping f : X → Y and any α ∈ TX, β ∈ TY with Tf (α) = β, there is a bijection g : X * → Y * such that Tg(α * ) = β * and f • h α = h β • g. Since it is easy to check that any strongly adequate uniform construction is adequate, we get:
If there is a strongly adequate uniform construction for T, then μML T ≡ MSO T / .
Example 2. As a first example, consider the finitary multiset ("bags") functor B, which sends a set X to the set of mappings f : X → ω such that the set {u ∈ X | f (u) = 0} is cofinite. The action on morphisms is given by letting, for f ∈ BX and h :
. Given a pair X, α where α : X → ω has finite support, we define
Here, we identify each each n ∈ ω with the set {0, ..., n − 1}. The mapping α * : X * → ω is defined by setting α * (w) = 1 for all w ∈ X * . The map h α : X * → X is defined by (u, i) → u. It is easy to check that the construction F is strongly adequate, hence μML B ≡ MSO B / .
As a final application, consider the set of all exponential polynomial functors [18] defined by the "grammar"
where C is any constant functor for some set C, and Id is the identity functor on Set. These functors cover many important applications: streams, binary trees, deterministic finite automata and deterministic labelled transition systems are all examples of coalgebras for exponential polynomial functors, as is the so called game functor whose coalgebras provide the semantics for "Coalition Logic" [6] . For this last instance, the "game functor" G for n agents can be written in the form of an exponential polynomial functor as follows:
Then, for a given set X, an element of GX will be a pair consisting of a vector S 0 , ..., S n−1 of available strategies for each player, together with an "outcome map" f assigning an element of X to each strategy profile in S 0 × ... × S n−1 .
Proposition 11. Every exponential polynomial functor admits a strongly adequate uniform translation.
Corollary 3. For every exponential polynomial functor T, we have μML
The following diagram illustrates the connection between the results that have been presented in this section:
The cases where we can find a strongly adequate uniform construction are the most straightforward applications of Theorem 6 that we know of. The Janin-Walukiewicz theorem is a less direct application: there is no strongly adequate uniform construction for the powerset functor, but there is an adequate uniform construction. In the next section, we shall study an example of a functor where there is no adequate uniform construction at all.
VI. THE MONOTONE NEIGHBORHOOD FUNCTOR
The final section of our paper concerns the monotone neighborhood functor M. Our main result concerns a characterization of the fragment of MSO M that is invariant under global neighborhood bisimulations, to be introduced below. Our proof applies the method of section V, but not directly: we will first see that the functor M itself does not admit an adequate uniform construction.
A. No adequate uniform construction for M
We first consider the negative result.
Proposition 12. There is no adequate uniform construction for the monotone neighborhood functor M.
Proof: To arrive at a contradiction assume that F is adequate. Fix some a ∈ A and consider the formula ϕ = ∀Z.(a ⊆ Z) expressing that a has empty extension.
Let Y be the set {u, v} and let β ∈ MY be the neighborhood structure {{u}, {u, v}}. Let V be any valuation with V (a) = {v}. 
B. The functor M
In this section, as a step towards our main characterization result, we shall consider the language μML M , where the functor M is a slight variation of the monotone neighborhood functor M. The functor M is obtained as the subfunctor of M × P given by
This is indeed a subfunctor of M × P, because given a map
Definition 20. For the functor M we define the unary predicate liftings and E by
and we let ♦ be the dual of and let E d be the dual of E.
The set Θ is an expressively complete set of liftings for M . We shall omit the proof of this fact here, and merely state it as the following proposition:
Proposition 13. Every monotone natural predicate lifting λ :
The main technical result of this section states the existence, for all k, of a uniform construction F that is adequate for k and with respect to the set of liftings { , E}.
Definition 21. Fix a natural number k. Given a set X, and object α ∈ M X, put
and let π X be the projection map from X * to X. Define α * = (N α * , S α * ) ∈ M (X * ) by setting S α * = X * , and set Z ∈ N α * for Z ⊆ S α * iff Y, j ⊆ Z for some Y ∈ α, Y ⊆ S α and some j < ω, where
The sets of the form Z, j will be called the basic members of N α * .
The main goal of this section is to prove the following: It is easy to check that, for all sets X and α ∈ M X, we have M π X (α F ) = α.
Our main goal in this section is to prove the following result, from which Proposition 14 now follows:
Here, and throughout this section, we write (X, α, V ) ≡ k (Y, β, U ) to say that two one-step models satisfy the same formulas of MSO 1 { ,E} (A) with at most n nested quantifiers. Let us keep the data X, Y, α, β, V and h fixed throughout the proof, and assume that M h(α) = β. We will also assume, from now on, that N α and N β are both non-empty sets: if one of them is empty then both of them are, and in this case the lemma can be proved essentially using an easier version of the argument we use below.
Definition 22. Given a finite set of variables A, a propositional A-type τ is a subset of A. Given a set X and a valuation 
and say that these one-step models match up to depth n, if: for every n-signature σ over variables B, either the number of basic elements of signature σ in N α * and N β * respectively are both finite and the same, or both infinite.
We are going to show, by induction on a natural number m ≤ k, that if two one-step models of the form (X * , α * , V 1 ) and (Y * , β * , V 2 ) match up to depth 2 m , then they satisfy the same formulas of quantifier depth m. For the basis case of 2 0 = 1, we need the following result:
Lemma 3. Let B be a set of variables containing A, and let 
But then the equivalence of ϕ ∈ MMSO and ψ ∀ ∈ μMML g is immediate from (3) and (4).
VII. FUTURE WORK
For a concise formulation of the contributions of this publication we refer to the abstract.
Here we mention some questions for future research: 1) Is there a good categorical characterization of those set functors T that admit an adequate uniform construction, for instance, in terms of T preserving certain limits or colimits? 2) Can we generalize our work in section VI, to the effect that every set functor T has a companion T that admits an adequate uniform construction? Can we then use this companion functor to prove invariance results for Tlogics, similar to Theorem 7? Relating this to the previous question, we would like to understand why M admits an adequate uniform construction, and M does not. 3) We intend to further explore the relation between MSO T and the first-order logic of Litak & alii [13] for Tcoalgebras. For instance, an interesting question would be whether (on T-tree models) MSO T is equivalent to some extension of this first-order language with certain fixpoint operators. Finally we note that after submitting the manuscript of the current publication, we could settle the main open question concerning the monotone neighborhood functor M in the positive. Based on Theorem 7 we can prove that μMML ≡ MMSO/ indeed. That is, a formula in MMSO is invariant under neighborhood bisimulations if, and only if, it is equivalent to a formula of the monotone μ-calculus μMML. We will report on this result in a future publication.
